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by David Pearce,* Gavin Mooney,t Ron Akehurst
and Peter West**
This paper attempts to apply two principles of rationality-efficiency and equity-to
the establishment ofair quality standards for total suspended particulates in the USA. It
is argued that standard setting should embrace either the use of some cost-benefit-risk
criterion, or some conceptofequity whereby risks are notreduced below levelsjudged to
be acceptable elsewhere. There is often a trade-offto be made betweenthese principles of
efficiency and equity and thatboth cannot be pursued in tandem. In other words, the cost
offairness is more deaths in total than there need be at a particular level ofexpenditure.
The concept of the "margin of safety" is also discussed, and we conclude that, as
currently defined, itis ofdoubtful relevance in eitherthe contextofefficiency orofequity.
Finally, and using evidence from other studies, we conclude that there are much more
cost-effective ways ofusing scarce resources to save lives (e.g., in health care and in road
safety) than pursuing the primary standards for TSP laid down by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency in light ofthe U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970
and 1977.
Introduction
The issue addressed in this paper is whether
the primary standard laid down by the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
in light ofthe U.S. Clean Air Act amendments of
1970 and 1977 has a foundation in what we term
"rational" approaches to standard setting. The
standards set for total suspended particulates
(TSP) were 75 gg/m3 annual geometric mean of
the 24 hr averages and 260 gg/m3 average 24 hr
measure. In addition, the concept of a margin of
safety was introduced, although in practice it was
left to the administrator ofthe EPA to determine
what constituted a "reasonable" marginof,safety.
It is argued that standard setting should embrace
either the use of some cost-benefit-risk criterion,
or some concept of equity whereby risks are not
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reduced below levels judged to be acceptable
elsewhere. We judge that neither paradigm has
beenused in settingtheprimaryparticulate stan-
dard and that, as a consequence, that standard is
currently too severe in terms of the burdens it
imposes on those who bearthe cost (ultimately, as
we suggest, the American people) for the benefits
it can be argued to achieve.
In stressing the role ofthe EPA Administrator
in protecting public health and in seeking to
ensure that he is not impeded by tactics designed
to prevent that task being fulfilled, the House of
Representatives has dismissed the relevance of
economic considerations (1). In this, it reflects the
entirehistory ofthe Federal Act, since, even in its
initial passage through Congress, numerous com-
mentators noted what has been called (2) the
"careful excising of almost all references in the
Act to considerations ofeconomic feasibility." De-
spite this, there has been relaxation of the Na-
tional Ambient Air Quality Standards in respect
of vinyl chloride, a pollutant with almost cer-
tainly no lower threshold (i.e., a level below
which no health effects arecaused), because ofthe
impossibility facedbythe industry in meetingthe
implied zero emissions requirement with knownPEARCE ET AL.
or immediately foreseeable technology. Instead,
EPA set a nonzero emission limit. Thus, faced
with the extreme consequences of following the
letter of the Clean Air Act, the EPA did allow
some consideration ofthe costs ofsuch action and
therefore ofquestions ofefficiency.
The Philosophy of
Rational Standard Setting
This paper considers the extent to which the
approach adopted in the United States for the
promulgation ofprimary standards for total sus-
pended particulate (TSP) matter can be consid-
ered to be based on rational foundations. We offer
two concepts of rationality. The first states that
an environmental standard is rational ifit is not
possible to alter it in such a way that society's
health risks are reduced without changing the
amount of money spent on reducing those risks.
This condition is met only if an extra dollar of
expenditure on improved conditions achieves the
same health benefit regardless of where it is
spent. This is the "efficiency" concept ofrational-
ity. The second concept ofrationality is defined in
terms of "acceptable" risk. This is formulated
differently according to which school of thought
one acknowledges. One would argue (3) that a
risk is acceptable in one sphere ofactivity ifit is
already accepted in some other sphere ofactivity,
or, ofcourse, ifhigher levels ofrisk are accepted
in the alternative activity. Another view of ac-
ceptable risk suggests that the degree of accept-
ability varies with the benefit expected from the
risk activity in question. On this basis, an accept-
able risk becomes one in which the benefits ex-
ceed the costs ofthe risk ofthe project as seen by
the person perceivingthe risk. In this respect, the
approach is akin to the efficiency definition of
rational approaches to standard setting (4).
The pursuit ofefficiency in the setting ofstan-
dards leads logically to the use ofcost-benefit (or
benefit-cost) analysis. To findthedegree ofaccept-
able risk on the efficiency approach, we must
compare the benefits obtained by the lowering of
risk levels (for example through legislation) and
the costs of achieving those risk reductions. A
risk would be acceptable when the benefits of
reducing it further were less than the costs of
achieving the reduction. Cost has necessarily to
be thought ofas "opportunity cost," i.e., the value
ofthe benefit we go without by choosing to spend
the money in one way rather than another. The
opportunity cost of setting environmental stan-
dards without reference to efficiency criteria can
therefore be forgone benefits which actually ex-
ceed the benefits obtained from the environmen-
tal standard.
Equity is a term which has a variety ofmean-
ings in different contexts, but its underlying con-
cern is with who gains and who loses. In the
context of setting environmental standards, the
pursuit ofequity would imply that people should,
in some sense, be treated fairly or equally.
Tb enable evaluation of environmental stan-
dards on equity grounds, it is necessary to have
some yardstick against which to judge the
results-some standard of"fairness." Many ofthe
recommendations on methods ofstandard setting
which are to be found in the scientific literature
on risk analysis maybe interpreted in the light of
the pursuit of equity. One such, the "acceptable
risk" method, has, as its basis, a concern to equal-
ize the risks suffered by different people from
different causes and to set this level at one which
is "generally acceptable" to society. In further-
ance of this argument several authors (3, 5-11)
have tabulated estimates ofrisks associated with
work, recreation and everyday living, usually in
terms offatality rates or occasionally accidents or
morbidity incidence rates. Whether such studies
accurately encompass the true meaning of the
concept ofrisk is a subject ofsome debate (12).
There will normally be a trade-offbetween effi-
ciency and equity, i.e., from a given situation, a
move toward greater equity is likely to lead to
greater inefficiency, and a more efficient move
will normally prove less equitable. But how can
this choice be made? Essentially, equity, effi-
ciency and the choice between them involve value
judgments on the part of policy makers. It is
possible to choose an efficient solution or an equi-
table solution or some mix of the two, but the
choice depends on the relative weights to be at-
tached to equity and efficiency, a value-laden
choice which nonetheless cannot be avoided. Be-
cause ofthe logical necessity ofchoosing weights,
economists are concerned to spell out the implica-
tions ofthose choices.
Equity and the Particulate
Primary Standard
This section argues that the concept of equity
as expounded in the previous section is not em-
braced by the procedures used for implementing
theprimaryparticulate standard. First, wewould
suggestthatthe concept ofamarginofsafetydoes
not readily fit into an equity-based framework.
Second, "acceptable risk" involves two precepts.
Onthe onehand, there is the assumption that the
concern is to equalize risks faced by different
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people, a concern the Act shares. On the other
hand, there is the assumption that there exists
some nonzero level of risk at which concern
ceases and which is therefore acceptable. This
view is certainly not embodied in the Act, for it
seeks to reduce to zero the probability of any air
pollution-related ill-health occurring. Yet, the at-
tempt to eliminate risk completely from our lives
is stultifying of enterprise and ultimately self-
defeating (13). Nor indeed is the idea ofreducing
this probability to zero embodied in other health
protecting legislation in the United States. For
example, arecentcourtruling (14) with respect to
occupational health and the use of benzene has
made it clear that in some circumstances a non-
zero level of risk of benzene-related ill health is
acceptable.
It could be that the events associated with
exposure to air pollution are so dreadful that,
even when combined with an extremely low prob-
ability ofoccurrence, they constitute a risk which
is above that normally acceptable. But this is
implausible. There are the beginnings of an un-
derstanding ofthose factors which affect individ-
uals' perception ofrisk and on this evidence there
are not strong grounds for expecting the adverse
reaction to the events associated with air pollu-
tion to be especially marked. Thus, the most im-
portant characteristics affecting this severity are
voluntariness, controllability, familiarity, imme-
diacy and predictability (15). Certainly the risks
are involuntary, but they have been with us a
long time and score reasonably well for controlla-
bility, familiarity and knowability, while most of
the risks which now exist lie in the future, after
prolonged exposure to pollution.
We observed that the pursuits of equity and
efficiency each have a cost in terms ofeach other.
Ifanefficiency-based approach is adopted, there is
a cost in the sense that some people may be
treated unfairly relative to others. The pursuit of
equity also has a cost in terms of efficiency. No
matter what level of risk is chosen on equity
grounds, any given level of expenditure would
prevent more premature deaths if it were spent
according to efficiency guidelines. The cost offair-
ness is more deaths in total than there need be at
that level of expenditure. It is but a small step
from recognizing the costs of pursuing zero risk
objectives to a rather fuller and more systematic
consideration ofefficiency.
Even if the Clean Air Act shunned economic
considerations in principle, in practice it is left to
the administrator ofthe EPA to determine what
constitutes a "reasonable" margin of safety. The
only level of particulate emission which could
guarantee zero risk is one at which the standard
is set in such a way that it exceeds the best
judgment of the threshold level by some factor
which accounts for both any statistical error in
the identification of the threshold, and any, as
yet, unidentified risks from ambient concentra-
tions greater than zero and less than the es-
tablished threshold level.
Following the work of Holland and his col-
leagues (16), we observe that, translated to US
measurement techniques, the level at which
health effects can be attributed to TSP (in the
presence ofSO2) is some 240 jg/M3. Between 130
gg/m3 and 240 gg/M3 the effects of TSP are not
discernible in the sense that they cannot be sepa-
rated out from other influences such as weather.
At levels below 130 gg/M3 no effects at all can be
demonstrated. Effectively, then, a 130gg/M3 stan-
dard would give the zero risk results which, we
argue, are dictated by the Clean Air Act as it now
stands, even ifwe find it impossible to accept that
a zero risk level ofeffect is a rational standard.
What meaning, therefore, is attached to the
margin ofsafety in this context? As noted above,
ithas little relevance in an equity-based standard
which has an "odd" equity objective, namely, zero
risk. That objective is odd because acceptable
risk, in our view, implies acceptance of some
positive risk levels. However, if we pursue the
zero risk requirement, we see that the 130 jg/M3
threshold already defines the lower bound of the
"possible effects" level ofTSP. That is, it already
embraces any statistical error in the data and
actually guarantees zero risk on the best scien-
tific evidence available. The problem then is that
togo lowerthan 130 jg/M3 entails aconcept ofthe
margin of safety which becomes untenable on
equity grounds (and, as we shall argue, on effi-
ciency grounds as well). For it is effectively "over-
kill." It does not reduce risks any further. Tb
argue that it insures against any unanticipated
risks aswell is to countenance complete arbitrari-
ness in setting standards-any number would in
fact meet the requirement, as long as it is below
130 jg/M3. Indeed, if one wants an absolute, un-
qualified guarantee of zero risk, the standard
would be set at zero. Yet a zero standard does not
exist because it is technologically and economi-
cally infeasible.
In short, it is difficult to see what the margin of
safety has to do with an equity-based concept ofa
standard since equity demands that the risks
associated with the eventual compliance with the
standards be the same as those risks elsewhere
(and, as noted above, that efficiency be ignored).
Yet nowhere else is zero regarded as the accept-
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able level ofrisk. We conclude that the margin of
safety concept implicit in the 75 jig/m3 standard is
inconsistent with the concept of an equity based
standard.
Last, one could ask whether the ratio of TSP
threshold levels to standard levels compares with
such ratios used elsewhere. For example, using
thejudgments ofHolland and his colleagues (16),
the ratio wouldbe about 1.75:1. Inradiation expo-
sure, various ratios are used. Ifexposed to 5 rems
in any one year (rem = a unit of exposure to
radiation), it is widely accepted that the risk of
dying at some time in a lifetime would be 1 in
2000. Spread over a working lifetime of, say 40
years, this is a risk of 1 in 80,000 of dying in a
given year from the effects of nonnatural radia-
tion (17). UK practice is to set the maximum
dosage to a worker at 1 rem, so that the margin of
safety is 5:1. This would appear favorable when
compared to the TSP ratio. Two comments can be
made. First, ifthe same ratio were used for TSP
in the USA, the primary standard would have to
be set at 26 gg/M3, which places us even further
into the realms of overkill in terms of the most
reliable information available. Second, the cost of
achieving the 5:1 ratio in radiation standards is
not very high, given continuous monitoring and
the ability to move exposed workers to less radio-
active areas for a while.
Comparison ofthe margin ofsafety in terms of
a ratio ofstandard to threshold level in compari-
son with other such ratios could argulably be said
to meet the "equity" requirement. The example
above suggests that such a comparison results in
a greater inconsistency for the TSP standard and
also hints that there is one overriding factor in
determining a margin of safety which must be
taken account of-namely, the cost of achieving
it.
Data limitations are such that it is not possible
to estimate with accuracy what the costs of com-
pliance with primary standards would be by
1985. However, using estimates by A.D. Little,
Inc. (18, 19), we have calculated that, assuming a
2% per annum growth in steel output, the maxi-
mum figure is some $36 billion, with a minimum
ofsome $23 billion at 1978 prices. Forzero growth
the range would be $10 to 15 billion.
Efficiency and the
Particulate Primary Standard
We have already observed that efficiency con-
siderations require that dollar expenditures on
the reduction in TSP concentrations should yield
higher benefits than expenditures diverted
elsewhere. More strictly, expenditure at the mar-
gin should yield the same benefit for the maxi-
mum health benefits to be achieved. One way of
approaching this issue would be to estimate di-
rectly the benefits from reducing TSP levels and
compare them with the costs estimated above. If
the benefit exceeds the cost, the 75 jig/m3 stan-
dard would be justified in principle, although it
would still be necessary to investigate whether
still higher benefits could not be achieved by
diverting the expenditure elsewhere. Ifthe bene-
fits are less than the cost, then, ideally, we would
identify the level of TSP concentration at which
benefits minus costs are maximized. This would
be above 75 pg/M3 and, ifbenefitswere foundto be
significantly less than costs, might even be near
to orat concentration levels above those currently
prevailing.
The problems with the direct approach are that
we are unable, because of data limitations, to
distribute the costs identified across TSP concen-
trations, i.e., we have an approximation of the
total cost of compliance for the period from 1980
to 1985 but we have no idea of the functional
relationship between TSP and abatement cost.
Close inspection ofthe cost data confirms that it
is not possible at present to determine this. More-
over, we have to bear in mind that two features of
the primary standard can be varied: first, the
standard itselfand, second, the margin ofsafety.
Ideally, we would like to know the money cost of
the margin of safety. In the previous section we
suggested that, ifthe "no effects" threshold is 130
,ug/m3, as suggested by Holland and his col-
leagues (16) then the major part of the costs
identified in that section must be regarded as the
cost ofthe margin of safety. What we cannot say
is precisely how much that cost is. We have no
exact data to indicate what would happen to am-
bient concentrations ofTSP in the relevant areas
ifthe 1980-85 expenditures were not undertaken.
New capital expenditures and the operating costs
associated with them are not clearly associated
with TSP levels in the current A. D. Little work
(18, 19). Nor do we know what would happen if
some ofthe operating costs associated with plant
in-place at end 1979 were negated by closure of
the control plant. This is a major data deficiency
and we see no way in which it can be overcome.
Here, certainly, there is scope for further re-
search.
To underline what such research might reveal,
consider Figure 1. This shows a benefit function
and an abatement cost function. Both are hypo-
thetical, save that we know that benefits cease at
a level of 130 ,ug/m3. They are also speculative for
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Abatement costs (2% industry growth)
Abatement costs (0% industry
growth)
the range 240 ,ug/m3 to 130 p.g/m3 which is the
range identified by Holland and his colleagues
(16) as havingpossible TSP reduction benefitsbut
inwhich those effects, ifthey exist, are not distin-
guishable from the effects of weather and other
variables. What we can be certain of is that the
abatement cost curve will continue rising
throughout the range and at an increasing rate.
As noted earlier, however, we have no idea ofthe
precise functional form. Note that, whatever the
costs of abatement, if the 130 pRg/m3 "no effects"
threshold is accepted as per Holland and his col-
leagues (16), all the extra expenditure incurred in
securing compliance with the primary standard
has no counterpart benefits. In terms of the effi-
ciency principle, we are saying that this expendi-
ture implies an infinite value of human life and
suffering since we can identify no health gains
from the extra expenditure. This is entirely con-
sistent with saying that the primary standard is
compatible with a zero risk plus "overkill" ele-
ment in the equity approach. If some error is
attached to the 130 ,ug/m3 threshold, i.e., if it is
right within ±10%, then, atbest, 10% ofthe extra
abatement expenditures would be worthwhile in
principle on the basis ofinsuring against possible
adverse health effects as required by the 1977
Clean Air Act amendments.
Despite the very limited data and the problems
of using the available cost data for our desired
purposes, it is possible to engage in some other
exercises to see what the 75 ,ug/m3 standard
means and what the implied margin of safety of
42 to 55 ,ug/m3 means. (The figure of 42 is
achieved by assuming some 10% statistical error
attached to the 130 ,ug/m3 level and the figure of
55 by assuming it contains no error since that
error is subsumed in the range 240 to 130 ,ug/m3.)
An Illustration Using the 1979
Wyoming Study
To illustrate the way in which a cost-benefit
approach might be used, we compare the cost
figure above with the benefit figure for reduced
particulate emissions to be found in the 1979
studyby Crocker et al. (20). This used a statistical
regression approach similar to that of Lave and
Seskin (21) but controlled for more variables. The
only significant statistical relationship found for
particulates was the claim that a 60% reduction
in average particulate concentrations would re-
duce pneumonia deaths in urban areas by 13,000
per annum. Ib these physical results, a "value of
human life" of$340,000 to $1 million was applied.
(Clearly these values must include some allow-
$23-36
billion1
Benefits,
Costs
S
0
l I
No discernible No
health effects effects
FIGURE 1. Benefits and costs ofreductions in TSP.
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ance for associated morbidity as well. Indeed in
any reference to a value oflife in the rest ofthis
paper, this should be readto embrace not only the
value oflifeperse but also the associated morbid-
ity.) The monetary health benefits were then
some $4.4-13.7 billion per annum (1978 prices).
The hypothetical 60% reduction is from a base
of102.3 ,ug/m3 whichwouldthusbe to 40.9 ,ug/m3,
well below the primary standard under the Clean
Air Act and, of course, implying that health ef-
fects are clearly discernible below that level. We
refrain from comment on that for current pur-
poses. Suppose thenwecalculate theimplied lives
saved for a reduction to 85 Rig/m3, since the 102.3
,ug/m3 appears to be an arithmetic mean in the
Wyoming study. We therefore convert the 75
,ug/m3 geometric mean standard to an 85 ,ug/m3
arithmetic mean standard. This wouldbe a 17.3%
reduction on the mean value assumed in the
Wyomingstudy (itrelates to an average for 1970).
Given the linearity assumptions in the study we
can then argue that 29% (17.3 divided by 0.6) of
the alleged benefits would supposedly ensue. This
would give us a figure of29% of 13,000 lives p.a.
which equals 3,748 lives. For a period of20 years
this comes to 74,967 lives saved. Recall that this
is for all TSP emissions, not just those from the
steel industry. We estimate that steel contributes
9% ofTSP (22) so that 6,747 lives would be saved.
For the various costs estimated above we then
have implied values oflife as shown in Table 1.
Table 1.
Abatement cost (billion) Implied value oflife (6747 lives)
$23-36 $3,409,000-5,336,000
10-15 1,482,000-2,223,200
Thus, even if we were to accept the valuation
and methodology of Crocker and his colleagues
(20), at no stage does the implied value of a
human life fall within the range of $0.34-1.0
million used inthat study. This is formally equiv-
alent to saying that cost-benefit criteria do not
justify furtherTSP control inthe steel industry to
the 75 ,ug/m3 standard.
An Illustration Using Other
Implied Values of Life
We also comparedthe abatement costs involved
with the number of deaths deferred taking the
Lave and Seskin (21) estimates as being correct
and without questioning them. A move from 130
,ug/m3 to 75 ,ug/m3 is a 42% reduction in TSP
concentration. Taking one of Lave and Seskin's
very high "elasticities" (the rate at which excess
deaths fall for a 1% reduction inTSP) at 0.08 (i.e.,
mortality falls by 8% of the fall in pollution) we
obtain a figure of8% of42% = 3.4% reduction in
mortality. Applied to an overall estimate ofmor-
tality this gives a figure of some 64,387 lives
"saved" per year from TSP reduction to the pri-
mary standard. Using our 9% TSP contribution-
by-steel estimate, this would give some 5,795
lives per annum saved by enforcement of the
standard. Over 15 years this suggests some
86,923 lives saved. The resulting "implied" values
thus lie in the range $110,000 to $410,000.
Superficially, then, the exercise using the high
Lave and Seskin "elasticity" looks far more
favorable to the use ofa standard of 75 ,ug/m3. It
requires acceptance of the Lave and Seskin esti-
mates which, we observe, are not consistent with
the epidemiological data reported by Holland and
his colleagues (16). However, even ifwe take the
Lave and Seskin figures, implied values found
elsewhere in preventive and curative medicine
(see Table 2) do not support such valuations, i.e.,
they are lower than the range reported above.
Table 2. Implied values oflife in various health care
policy areas.
Policy area Implied value oflife Source
Pulmonary embolism $19,000 (23)
Renovascular disease 25,000 (23)
Heart attacks (24)
Ambulance 6,000
Mobile coronary unit 8,300
ltiage plus ambulance 27,000
Screening 46,000
Critically ill patients 24,000 (per year oflife) (25)
End-stage renal disease 24,000 (per year oflife) (26)
What emerges from this outline of a few case
studies in the health sector are two important
considerations. (1) While it is frequently difficult
to compare "like with like," because of difficult
base lines for costs, differenttime horizons, differ-
ent types of output, etc., nonetheless it is clear
that there is a wide range of values being at-
tached to lives saved and years oflife extended in
decisionmaking on resource allocation in the
health sector; (2) Some ofthe values emerging for
programs which are not or at least are not widely
available in the health sector are low compared to
those likely to be implied by the analysis in this
section of the costs and benefits of the proposed
standards for TSP abatement, thereby suggest-
ing, in the context of the cost-benefit approach,
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that resources would be better expended in these
areas ofhealth care than in TSP abatement.
Again, the mortality reduction which would
follow from the cumulative introduction of vari-
ous road safety measures has been reported (27).
Thus, costs of approximately $18 billion over a
10-year period (at 1978 prices) would have fore-
stalled 138,000 fatalities. On the most favorable
estimate of TSP reduction benefits, 87,000 lives
would be saved for a comparable sum of money.
The TSP control expenditure is thus less cost-
effective i.e., if it were to be pursued, there are
many more efficient ways of saving life which
ought to be implemented ahead ofit.
Conclusions on Efficiency
Approaches
Bearing in mind the deficiencies in the data
that we have used, we have attempted to secure
"most favorable" comparisons in cost-benefit
terms for TSP reduction expenditures. By this we
mean that we have made the case as favorable to
TSP control as we could, by adopting high values
taken from other studies or taking extreme as-
sumptions such as a zero threshold.
We would propose that the rules ofcost-benefit
analysis for the rational allocation of resource
within the economy have not been honored ifthe
benefits obtained from TSP reduction are less
than they would be if hypothetically spent
elsewhere. That is what this paper has set out to
show, and we argue that the weight of evidence
favors the demonstration ofthis proposition.
The report on which this paper is based was written for and
funded by the American Iron and Steel Institute. We wish to
acknowledge their supportfor this work. The viewsexpressed,
however, do not necessarily represent those of the Institute.
Any errors are, of course, the responsibility of the authors
alone.
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